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Scholarship on the judicia, y indicates that the ability of the media to
interpret accurately and describe clearly judicial decisions, and more
specifically Supreme Court decisions, is limited. Since the public generally relies on media accounts to find out what the High Court has
decided, this limitation is significant. We investigate whether the print
media accurately described the Supreme Courts recent decisions in the
two affirmative action cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003). Wefind that most newspapers addressed the legal queries
in both cases, expressed support for these split judgments, and considered some of the repercussions of these rulings. However, the press
generally failed to discuss dissenting opinions, relevant background
information, and potential implications of the ruling. As a result, the
public was deprived of contextual knowledge and information necessary for developing informed judgments about these decisions and the
public issues they involve.

udicial scholars assert that members of the press play a crucial role in communicating Supreme Court decisions. In fact,
they tell us that the public generally does not read Supreme
Court decisions; rather, they rely on press accounts to discover
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what the High Court has decided . Scholars also emphasize that
media coverage of Supreme Court directives is often limited and
misleading . Deadlines , space limitations , and the difficult process of reducing lengthy, convoluted, and legalistic language into
brief , comprehensible and coherent sentences help explain why
the press has not always done an effective job in explaining Supreme Court directives. Supreme Court justices have hinted or
even stated explicitly that press accounts do not accurately report
what they have decided.
In this study, we investigate whether the media have accurately described the Supreme Court 's recent affirmative action
decisions . The Grutter case questioned whether the University of
Michigan Law School could consider race and ethnicity, among
other factors, in making admission decisions. By contrast, Gratz
focused on whether the University of Michigan's Undergraduate
Admission Office can utilize race as a factor in selecting students. The decisions-simultaneously endorse and reject the use
of affirmative action in a single institution- have been seen by
many journalists as "splitting the baby," referencing the wisdom
of King Solomon in rendering a difficult decision . In conducting
our investigation , we analyze immediate newspaper coverage of
these decisions. We assess whether coverage was provided;
whether the legal issues taken up in these cases, and the reasoning of the Court 's majority and dissenting opinions, were mentioned ; whether the accounts expressed agreement or disagreement with the decisions; and whether the impact and implications of these decrees were discussed. These variables are selected because scholars who have probed newspaper coverage of
Supreme Court judgments have typically considered them in assessing whether the media is able to depict accurately the Court 's
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reasonmg and outcomes immediately after decisions are rendered.
The Relation ship of the Media to the Courts
Unlike the other branches of the federal government, the judiciary does not speak directly to the public ; consequently, the
media's interpretation of the Supreme Court is very significant.
As an unelected branch in a majoritarian political system, the
judiciary requires public approval and support to maintain the
legitimacy it needs to be effective. Yet, courts do not directly
communicate with the public outside of their legal rulings. The
media is generally the filter through which the public understands the courts , discovers the decisions of the courts , and interprets the implications of the courts' determinations (Jamieson
1998). As Elliot Slotnick and Jennifer Segal (1998, 1) have argued
[I]n democratic political systems , the interaction and communication between political elites and institutions and the
mass public are considered of primary importance . Beca use
democratic governments are established to serve their citizens, the flow of information between elites and masses is
critical to the functioning of these governments and to their
perceived legitimacy. Ideally, effective democratic citizenship requires that the people know about the activities of
their officials and institutions so that they may protect their
interests by evaluating and holding them accountable for
their actions . Political information is significant for the optimal functioning of this process .

As the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court is particularly dependent on the media . Judicial scholars assert that members of the press play a crucial role in communicating both SuVO L.
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preme Court decisions (Wasby 1978; Baum 1998; Canon and
Johnson 1999) and in covering appellate court decision-making
(Newland 1964; Larson 1985; Slotnick and Segal 1998). The
public relies on press accounts, both articles and editorials, to
find out what the High Court has actually decided (Slotnick and
Segal 1998). Accuracy in media coverage would seem to be very
important for the Supreme Court to maintain its legitimacy, as
the Court frequently requires public approval to ensure proper
enforcement of its rulings by the electorally-accountable
branches of government (Davis 1994; Canon and Johnson 1999;
Davis and Strickler 2000).
Scholarship on the judiciary has demonstrated that the ability
of the media to interpret accurately and describe clearly the decisions of the judiciary , and more specifically the Supreme Court,
is limited. Deadlines, space limitations, a reduction in the regular
coverage of the Courts, as well as the difficult process of reducing lengthy, convoluted , and legalistic language into brief, comprehensible, and coherent sentences, are some of the reasons
why the press has not always done an effective job in explaining
Supreme Court directives (Ginsburg 1995; Fleeson 2002). In
addition, the federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court,
have policies and practices that distract from quality media coverage (Ginsburg 1995; Greenhouse 1996). Such policies include
a refusal to comment on decisions beyond that provided by their
written opinions, and their closed conference deliberations.
Hence , it is not surprising that Supreme Court justices have
themselves indicated that press accounts do not accu_rately report
what they have decided. According to Laurence Baum (1998,
381):
VOL.
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Justice O'Connor has observed [that] 'The summaries of the
opinions of this Court carried in the media ... frequently provide a perspective , not only on the work of the court but also
on the perceptions and judgments of the reporters and their
editors .' Likewise, Justice Brennan has suggested that the
media 's attacks on the Court 's decisions affecting the media
themselves are umeasonable , unintelligent , and inaccurate .

These limitations are exacerbated by the fact that much court
coverage is reported by journalists with limited legal training
who are waiting for more glamorous posts at the White House or
on the Hill. Issues that are more salient to the public, such as
controversies over individual rights, are deemed more newsworthy and tend to attract more media scrutiny than topics with
greater doctrinal importance or constitutional significance (Katsh
1983; Haltom 1998; Slotnick and Segal 1998). The consequence
of these factors has been a public that obtains its information
about a significant institution through a medium, both print and
televised, that does not prioritize the quality or quantity of its
judicial coverage. Yet we know that one of the most significant
factors related to the effective implementation of Supreme Court
decisions is public support and approval (Canon and Johnson
1999).
Limited research has been conducted on the implementation
and impact of Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action in
higher education (the few exceptions are Dreyfuss and Lawrence
III 1979; Ball 2000). More extensive research has been conducted on school desegregation , prayer in schools, libel law, the
rights of the accused, and reapportionment. One possible reason
for such limited scholarship might be the few rulings the Court
has issued on the topic. But in the summer of 2003, the Supreme
Court rendered two highly significant decisions in Gratz v.
Bolling er and Grutter v. Bolling er.
VO L.
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Prior to 2003, the last significant Supreme Court precedent on
the issue of affirmative action in higher education was in 1978,
in the plurality decision of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke . As part of their study twenty years later, in Television News and the Supreme Court: All the News Thats Fit to Air,
Slotnick and Segal (1998 , 151-152) carefully examined television coverage of the Bakke case, and found that the salience of
the issue of affirmative action in higher education led to an
atypically high level of television coverage; rarely has there been
so much media scrutiny over a single case. They discovered,
however , that the Court's decision in Bakke was not accurately
portrayed in the televised reports. Slotnick and Segal (1998 , 109)
argued that the choice of
utilizing the personage of Allan Bakke to focus on the issue
of quotas and " less qualified " minorities was understandable
for the network newscasts. The issues contained drama and
controversy and, clearly, represent what television news
seeks the most of and does best. Furthermore , divergence in
standardized scores was an easy topic for journalists to portray in the news format .... Yet to the extent that such reporting suggested that blacks admitted under the UC-Davis
plan were "unqualified " (and, on balance, the reports appeared to do just that), news coverage misreported and misrepresented an important fact in the case .

This inaccuracy may have strongly influenced the public perception of affirmative action in higher education as unfair.
After Bakke , the Supreme Court abdicated its authority and
allowed lower federal courts to make decisions that appeared to
eradicate the ruling made in Bakke, and by refusing to hear the
challenges to these decisions , allowed them to stand. This was
most specifically the case in the Fifth Circuit decision of Texas v.
Hop wood (1996). Most of the controversy around the appellate
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court's decision focused on the fact that a federal appellate panel
determined that the Court's ruling in Bakke , which held that creating a diverse student body is a compelling governmental interest, was no longer a binding precedent. This was especially significant because the Supreme Court had not overturned Bakke.
Hence, for those mostly conservative political actors who hoped
to find affirmative action unconstitutional , the University of
Michigan cases were of critical importance; they determined the
scope of the application of the Hopwood decision. President
George Bush and the Solicitor General decided to use Grutter
and Gratz to challenge Bakke and the use of affirmative action in
higher education. The salience of this issue for many public actors and the general public is manifest in the fact that the Michigan cases attracted more amicus curiae briefs than even the previous record-holder, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
(1989). Thus, the 2003 cases of Grutter and Gratz clearly represented an opportunity for the Court to address the issues once
again. But did the media do a more accurate job in interpreting
these two cases than it had in Bakke? This is the main question
we address in this study.
There are two reasons for performing this analysis. The first
is that as far as we can determine, no other study has systematically probed press coverage of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.
Bollinger. We intend to fill this gap in the literature by exploring
how newspapers construed the Supreme Court's decrees. The
second rationale for this analysis is that previous studies of Supreme Court decisions have mainly concentrated on school
vouchers (Jones and Briscoe 2002), school desegregation (Orfield, Eaton , and Harvard Project on School Desegregation
1996), prayer in public schools (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971),
libel (Gruhl 1980), the rights of the accused (Canon 1973), and
VOL.
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reapportionment (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988). Fewer studies
have focused on affirmative action (Urofsky 1997). By paying
attention to media constructions of the Supreme Court 's recent
affirmative action decisions , and by taking into consideration the
variables weighed in other studies, this analysis contributes to a
small but growing body of literature.
DATA AND FINDINGS

We identified 32 national and regional newspapers and examined all articles and editorials that mentioned Gratz and Grutter
during the period of June 23, 2003 through December 31, 2003 .1
Newspapers were selected to ensure adequate coverage of the
entire country. The data pool emphasizes newspapers with large
circulation s, without duplicating regional coverage whenever
possible (e.g., Ohio has three major papers with large circulations-only one was selected). These sources were evaluated in
light of whether or not they covered the Gratz and Grutter cases;
called attention to the legal issues in these lawsuits; explained
the legal reasoning behind the decrees; indicated agreement or
disagreement with judgments ; and examined the impact and implications of these rulings.

1

The data pool inc ludes: the Atlanta Co11
s litution, the Boston Globe, the Chicago Su11Times, Chrislian Science Monitor, the Columbus Dispat ch, the Denver Post, Hartford
Courant, the Hous/011Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, the U11ion Leader (Man chester,
NH ), the Commercial App eal (Memphi s, TN ), Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Star Tribune
(Minn eapolis, MN), Times Picayune (New Orl ean s, LA), News day (New York), the New
York Times, the Virginia Pilot (No rfolk, VA ), the Oakland Tribune, Pillsburgh PostGazelle, Richmond Times Dispat ch, St. Louis Post Dispatch , St. Petersburg Times, Sall
Lake Tribune, San Antonio Express-News, the San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, the
Washington Post, and the Washington Times.
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Coverage of Cases
The first question the study addresses is to what degree the
newspapers selected for mentioning Grutter and Gratz actually
covered the decisions. According to this analysis, "cover" means
that the newspaper called attention to these rulings in a front
page article , cited both cases in their headlines , or reported both
cases within forty-eight hours after the High Court handed down
the decisions. The objective was to analyze the articles that
would most immediately frame the reader 's understanding of the
issue. Using these standards , all of the selected newspapers covered the Supreme Court 's decisions in Grutter and Gratz (see
Table 1 below) . The widespread coverage probably reflected
both recognition of public salience and the fact that the two cases
marked the first time in 25 years that the Court ruled on whether
universities could consider race in admitting students. As the
literature demonstrates , landmark cases do enjoy much greater
coverage by the press than do typical rulings. We evaluate below
the coverage and assessment provided by those papers that wrote
editorials on these cases.
The Mention of Legal Issues
The second question probes whether newspapers mentioned
the legal issues in their coverage of the Supreme Court 's decision-making. The key legal query in Grutter was whether the
University of Michigan Law School could consider race in selecting students , and the key question in Gratz was whether or
not the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions office violated the Constitution when it implemented a racesensitive admission policy. We found that 91% of the newspapers
accurately cited the legal questions in both cases . This is not surVOL.
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prising insofar as the questions in both cases were straightforward and were clearly articulated in the cases: the first queried
Table 1,
Summary of Newspapers' Coverage of Gratz and Grutter
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whether the law school contravened the Constitution by using
race as one among many factors in selecting students, while the
second asked whether the undergraduate office disobeyed the
Constitution by inappropriately weighing race as a factor in the
admissions process. Although nearly all the newspapers mentioned the legal issues, how they provided their analyses varied.
Two observations about the headlines are in order, First, most
newspaper headlines accurately reported that the High Court
VOL.
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rendered two affirmative action decisions--one upholding affirmative action and the other striking it down. Specifically, we
found that 19 newspapers noted that the Supreme Court issued
two opinions concerning affirmative action policies at the University of Michigan while 13 did not. The headline in the Columbus Dispatch typified press accounts that accurately depicted
what the Court decided. That headline read "U.S. Supreme Court
Affirmative Action; Justices OK Race-Based Admissions with
Limits; Law School Policy at Michigan Upheld: Undergraduate
Rules Go Too Far, Court Says" (Torry 2003). Similarly, the Los
Angeles limes, in a more general fashion, conveyed the same
message. It notes "Supreme Court Rulings; Court Affirms Use of
Race in University Admissions: Justices Render Two Close Decisions Involving the University of Michigan, One Stresses the
Need for Affirmative Action, the Other Reasserts Limits." While
the Los Angeles limes did not draw a distinction between the law
school and the undergraduate programs, the headline transmitted
the message that one affirmative action policy at the University
could be justified while the other could not (Savage 2003).
While 59% of the newspapers bore headlines that recognized
that the Supreme Court rendered two opinions, only the Denver
Post identified in detail the names of both cases, as well as the
substance of the Court's ruling. This paper's headline read:
Court backs diversity in college admissions; Landmark ruling keeps affirmative action alive; Grutter vs. Bollinger : Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote upholds a program at University
of Michigan's law school that gives race a limited edge in
admissions decisions. Gratz vs. Bollinger: Court strikes
down in a separate 6-3 vote a point system used by the University of Michigan to give minorities preference in undergraduate admissions (Farrell 2003).
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When compared to the other newspapers, this lengthy 62-word
caption is unusual, but it does succeed in disseminating important information about the cases to its audience.

Rationales Behind Grutter and Gratz
The third question asks whether the newspapers report the
explanations behind the justices' varied opinions. Did the press
cover the majority and dissenting opinions in Grutter and Gratz?
Six Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Ginsburg, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy) composed opinions in
the two cases. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion in
Grutter, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg. Justices Scalia and Thomas sided with a portion of
O'Connor's opinion in which she expressed the belief that in 25
years the Court would no longer consider race in selecting students. O'Connor made clear that, in the meantime, the University
of Michigan Law School could consider race as a factor in selecting students because multiple educational benefits flow from
a diverse student body.
Justice Ginsburg also authored a concurring opinion in
which she backed major portions of O'Connor's decision, but
questioned the section that stressed that universities would be
barred from weighing race as a factor in selecting students in 25
years. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion in which he
agreed in part with O'Connor's Grutter decision. Specifically,
Thomas sided with O'Connor's view that in 25 years universities
should discontinue using race in making admissions decisions.
Like Thomas, Justice Scalia also sided with that segment of
O'Connor's Gratz opinion in which she stipulated that a deadline
VOL.
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should be set when universities would no longer be able to utilize race in the admission process.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas, dissented. His primary objection was that the Law
School's effort to attain a critical mass of minority students was
a transparent effort to promote a racial quota. Thomas also composed a dissenting opinion in which he expressed disagreement
with a portion of O'Connor's majority opinion. He took issue
with the majority's argument that the Constitution permitted universities to consider race, along with other factors, in creating a
diverse student body. Scalia also wrote a dissent in which he objected to the portion of the majority opinion that suggested educational benefits flow from a heterogeneous student body. Justice Kennedy's separate dissent posited that the Court misapplied
the strict scrutiny test. In other words, Kennedy maintained that
if the Court had clearly applied this particular standard, the law
school's affirmative action plan would have been stricken.
Disagreements among the justices were similarly reflected in
the Gratz decision, in which seven justices composed opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Breyer, and Kennedy, pointed out that the
University of Michigan's undergraduate program's point system
was constitutionally defective because it did not consider all facets of an applicant's file. O'Connor generally concurred with
Rehnquist and added that the University's undergraduate admissions office policy was fundamentally different from the law
school policy. Thomas underscored the point that under the Constitution, universities should not take race into account. Breyer
disagreed with Thomas, but argued that the University of Michigan's undergraduate admission's office relied too heavily on race
in selecting students.
VOL.
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In his dissenting opinion, Stevens indicated that the Court
should never have granted the litigants standing in Gratz. Souter
likewise argued that the litigants had no personal stake in the
outcome of the case, and also took issue with the majority's assertion that race played a predominant role in the undergraduate
admissions policy. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion observed that
the undergraduate system of awarding points on race to minority
students was constitutionally acceptable because it helped minority groups who have historically and presently been affected by
discrimination.
None of the 32 papers covered all of the opinions announced
in Gratz and Grutter. What they do cover are the key majority
opinions in both cases. All of the newspapers examined include
at least a brief statement regarding the Supreme Court's majority
opinion in Grutter. Most of the newspapers cite Justice
O'Connor as the author for the majority's decree in Grutter.
Many offer quotes from Justice O'Connor to help explain how
the Court's majority reached its conclusions. For example, using
O'Connor's explanation that Michigan's law school utilized a
"highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file,"
newspapers detailed the Court's reasoning in Grutter. However,
aside from these commonalities, the newspapers are quite varied
in the amount of detail they give to their explanations of the
Court's reasoning, particularly in regard to dissenting opinions.
Some articles merely note that the Court was "highly divided,"
while others offer hints in their headlines as to what the divisions
meant in terms of the Justices' interpretation of the Bakke case.
As the Boston Herald explained, "a sharply divided Supreme
Court said colleges and universities may use race," but the article
does not offer any insight into the dissension on the Court or
how the justices interpreted Bakke in light of constitutional standards (Rothstein 2003).
VOL. 34 2006
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Regarding the dissenting opinions, 75% of the newspapers
did not do a thorough job of explaining the dissenter's viewpoints. In fact , many do not mention anything about the dissenting opinion, not even naming which justices dissented. One
newspaper , the New York Times, was very detailed in its accounting of the opposing viewpoints of the Court. The Times summarized its understanding this way:
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the principal dissenting opinion that spoke for all four including Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. He took a more oblique approach that attacked the law school program not so much for its premise
as for how it works in practice, dismissing it as 'a carefully
managed program designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants from selected minority groups.' Justice Kennedy, writing separately, said that Justice Powell's
opinion in the Bakke case ' states the correct rule for resolving this case,' but that the court had not applied the ' meaningful strict scrutiny' under which the program should have
been found unconstitutional (Greenhouse 2003).
The explicit coverage by the New York Times is not surprising. As often noted in the scholarly literature, the New York
Times is one of the few print outlets that has continuously emphasized the significance of the courts. The Times has one of the
few reporters dedicated to Supreme Court coverage , and this reporter , Linda Greenhouse, is renown for her consistently high
level of analysis (Davis 1994, Haltom 1998).
Newsday was similarly explicit , clarifying that four Justices
dissented, that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the main dissent ,
and that Justices Kennedy and Scalia wrote separate dissents.
The reporter, Tom Brune, was careful to clarify how the dissent-
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ers agreed and disagreed relative to the Bakke decision, as the
following excerpt demonstrates .
In a separate dissent , Justice Anthony M. Kennedy endorsed
Powell 's diversity rationale , but said that the majority had
failed to properly apply strict scrutiny to the law school's
program. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas rejected Powell's diversity rationale . Rehnquist rejected the law school's policy as
"racial balancing. " Thomas found all use of race in admissions to be unconstitutional. But Scalia issued the harshest
dissent , calling the diversity rationale "a patriotic , allAmerican system of racial discrimination " and attacking
Michigan for its "maintaining a ' prestige ' law school whose
normal admissions standards" exclude minorities (Brune

2003).

Newspapers that provided details regarding dissenting opinions, such as the names of dissenters, often quoted Justice Clarence Thomas and identified him as the Court's only black member. A majority of those newspapers whose analysis indicated a
lack of support for one or both rulings cited Justice Thomas'
quotation of Frederick Douglass' 1865 address to abolitionists .
Thomas, upholding his long-standing opposition to affirmative
action, stated that blacks only needed justice, not pity-" simply
justice ...all I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs.
Let him alone." Newspapers also frequently referenced Justice
Thomas' statement that, "I believe blacks can achieve in every
avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators" (see, e.g., MacDonald (2003)) . While we cannot
forget the constraints of space in a newspaper, the selective discussion of concurring and dissenting opinions in stories appear
to be designed to support the reporter 's analysis as to the wisdom
of the decisions.
VOL. 34 2006
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Richard Davis (1994 , 67) quotes a new Supreme Court press
corps member as explaining the significance of space limitations:
"When my job first opened , my editors interviewed about a half
dozen lawyers thinking at first they really wanted someone with
a law degree . They realized these people were interested in tiny
legal twists and turns of opinion and not the larger picture. When
you only have 20 inches to write a story, you really need to be
general and you need to grab that reader ."
Finally , the press may not have reported all decisions because they did not deem the concurring and dissenting opinions
important to the readers ' understanding of the case . The majority
opinion is what results in the actual determination of the law, so
concurring and dissenting opinions may be perceived as only
more obit er dicta and not relevant to an understanding of the
case 's determination .

Support or Non-Support for Grutter and Gratz
With respect to the question of whether the newspapers indicated approval or disapproval of these affirmative action rulings,
we discovered that most of the newspapers ' editorials demonstrate agreement with the Supreme Court's split decisions in
Grutter and Gratz. They endorse the Grutter decree that said
that the University of Michigan Law School could weigh race as
a factor in admitting students , and they support the Gratz ruling
which held that the University of Michigan's undergraduate admission office used race in an unlawful fashion when it awarded
points partly on the basis of race . Interestingly , the newspaper
editors generally reason that race can be used but not too much.
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In conclusion, in this set of cases, the majority opinions are
consistently announced, while concurring and dissenting opinions are generally ignored. The majority opinions are likely cited
because the O'Connor opinion made plain that universities could
consider race in admission processes, something the Court had
not reaffirmed in 25 years, while the Rehnquist majority was
likely highlighted because it indicated what kind of affirmative
action plan is constitutional. The newspapers' failure to report all
opinions might be explained by three factors articulated in the
literature.
First, the need to communicate to a mass audience helps explain why the media ignored key elements of the decisions such
as "strict scrutiny," "compelling state interest," "narrowly tailored," and "standing." Relatedly, and as the scholarly literature
indicates, outside of the few regularly assigned Supreme Court
reporters, many members of the press who cover the Court are
not legally trained (Davis 1994). Tony Mauro, who covered the
Court for USA Today, Legal Times, and Gannett News Services,
has argued that not having a formal legal background was an
asset to his legal reporting. "It makes it easier to explain to lay
people if I've gone through the same basic questions the reader
has when I'm writing the story. I can still ask dumb questions. I
feel I'm not as tempted to write in legalese" (Davis 1994, 67).
This reasoning appears operative in much of the coverage in the
Michigan cases. Reporters said little to nothing about Justice
Steven's suggestion that the Court should have dismissed Gratz
because the litigant lacked standing. In addition, the press did not
report on Justice Kennedy's claim that the Court did not properly
apply the strict scrutiny test.
Second, the press may not record all opinions because of the
limited space allotted to coverage of Supreme Court decisions.
VOL. 34 2006

SPL!ITING THE BABY

135

The following editorial from the Houston Chronicle captures the
view of the majority of editorials.
Monday 's two-pronged decision was in some ways an upholding of the 1978 Bakke case . .. and a rejection of the
immediate challenge to the long-established precedent. But
it also more narrowly defined the ways "affirmative action"
is deemed constitutionally acceptable. The broader residual
argument, however, is about the value of diversity and the
undesirability of homogeneity. The Michigan cases served to
highlight that issue to an unprecedented degree . The level of
support from corporate America , past and present military
leaders and others who filed "friend of the court" briefs in
favor of the effort to provide equal opportunity across the
board is remarkable. . . . Chief Justice William Rehnquist
declared for the majority that the program for the undergraduate college went too far in providing an advantage to
the selected minorities and thus violated the constitutional
equal protection provisions (Reinert and Nissimov 2003).

Citing the Supreme Court 's Bakke decision and the amicus
briefs filed by corporate and military officials, most of the editorials contend that universities should be able to weigh race as a
factor in the admissions process because of the benefits that flow
from a diverse classroom. Yet these same editorials believe that
when points are awarded on the basis of race , such a system resembles a racial quota , discriminates against whites , and postpones the day when America becomes a colorblind society. This
perspective is quite consistent with the decisions of the Supreme
Court .
Most of the editorials clearly articulated this distinction between the two plans. As one editor cleverly noted ,
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When judges look for middle ground in a case and offer a little something to both sides, it's called "splitting the baby."
The reference , of course , is to wise King Solomon and his
prudent decision to threaten to sever a baby as a ploy for getting to the truth . What's often forgotten , of course , is that
Solomon never actually did split the baby. And if he had, it
would have been regarded as one of the most wrong-headed
judicial rulings in history {A Wise, Affirmative Ruling
2003) .

Several editorials argued that the Court in its twin decisions
was "splitting the baby" by simultaneously endorsing and rejecting the use of affirmative action by one university. And most
found this Solomonic decision appropriate and correct, appreciating the concluding comments by the previously quoted newspaper. "In the two Michigan cases, by affirming affirmative action while limiting the way it can be applied , the court ' split a
baby ' and made good law."
While most newspapers endorsed the Supreme Court's twin
rulings, 25% of the newspapers we surveyed took issue with the
Grutter decision, while only 3% challenge Gratz. Those opposed to Grutter argued that it is confusing , results in "reverse
discrimination," divides the country and is wrong . For examp le,
after describing the divided decision , an editorial from the Rocky
Mountain News in Denver , Colorado states:
The U.S. Supreme Court delivered a split decision Monday
in two affirmative action cases at the University of Michigan, guaranteeing that colleges and universities can continue to practice racial discrimination under the name of diversity, but only if they 're coy about it. ... The majority accepted Powell 's claim [in Bakke] that diversity is a "compelVOL. 34 2006
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ling state interest" that potentially justifies race-based policies that would otherwise violate the constitutional right to
equal protection under the law. This is a muddle (and we
.won't even go into the tangle of conflicting and partial concurrences and dissents). In fact, it has been a muddle ever
since Powell said it, except that in 1978 he was the only justice claiming diversity as compelling state interest. Now
there are five votes for his claim . Diversity as a fact is a
strength of the country. Diversity as an institution's recruitment goal is actually commendable . But diversity as legal
rationale for discriminatory practices by government is in
conflict with the more fundamental principle that the state
and the law should not treat people of one race differently
from people of a different race, no matter how wellintentioned the policy and no matter which group is preferred .... The decision in Gratz arguably undermines the decision in Grutter .... (Jones 2003).

On the other hand, several newspapers stressed that Grutter
was a wise decision, in part because it challenges misconceptions
about race and the Constitution. An editorial from the St. Petersburg Tzmes most clearly articulates this response to the conservative critique of affirmative action by contending that " [t]hose
who sought a simple declarative about race and higher education
were disappointed by the Supreme Court," and by then explaining :
The Court peeled away two smothering layers of political
pretense about affirmative action. The first is that the government should be out of the business of making decisions
based on a person's race, that any form of racial distinction
is pernicious. But race, as the Court said in a 5-4 opinion
written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor , is still a factor that
can't be ignored. It shapes people's lives and opportunities,
VOL.
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and universities such as Michigan serve a vital role for society when they provide racial diversity. The second fiction is
that racial diversity can be achieved without consideration of
race. President Bush and his brother , Governor Jeb Bush,
asked the Court to follow their policies in Texas and Florida ,
which guarantee university admission to a certain percentage
of graduates in every high school. The Court was unim pressed .... Race does indeed matter, which is why the nation struggles with it, and why the Court 's decision was imperative (Race Still Matters , 2003).

Thus , while the vast majority of the headline stories clearly
noted the key rulings in the twin cases , there was considerable ,
and unsurprising , disagreement among the editors of these newspapers when it came to analyzing the wisdom of the decisions .

Recognized Impact and Implications of Grutter and Gratz

The final question this study evaluates is whether or not the
press reported stories about the impact and implications of the
Grutter and Gratz decisions. "Impact " is defined as what occurred immediately after the decisions , whereas " implications "
denote what is likely to occur in the long run. All of the newspapers did make some assessment of the impact and implications of
the decisions . Indeed , scrutiny of the different publications reveals that newspapers observed two short-term consequences
flowing from the cases . The first is that the Court made plain
that it is constitutionally permissible for colleges to use race in
the admissions process. The second is that the newspapers
stressed that the Court specified what colleges could or could not
do if they opted to adopt affirmative action plans. Consider the
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following story that appeared in the Washington Post one day
after the Supreme Court handed down the decisions in Grutter
and Gratz:
The Supreme Court issued a qualified but resounding endorsement of affirmative action in higher education yesterday, in a pair of decisions that, taken together, ratified diversity as a rationale for race-conscious admissions and laid out
constitutionally acceptable means for achieving it ... The
net effect of the two rulings was to permit public and private
universities to continue to use race as a "plus factor" in
evaluating potential students- provided they take sufficient
care to evaluate individually each applicant's ability to contribute to a diverse student body (Lane 2003 ).

In this article , the reporter indicates that one of the consequences of the decisions is the continued use of race in the admissions process, as long as universities and colleges engage in
systematic, file-by-file analysis of each candidate's contribution
to a more diverse student body.
Like the Washington Post, the Boston Globe asserts that the
impact of Gratz and Grutter was to remove constitutional doubts
hanging over affirmative action programs and to offer guidance
on how to put together a legally defensible affirmative action
program. The Boston Globe distinguishes between mandatory
affirmative action programs and voluntary programs.
The rulings do not require undergraduate colleges or professional schools to use race as a factor, but allows them to do
so. Affected are most educational institutions in the country
that are selective in granting admissions , if they are run by
government or receive public aid, including private elementary and high schools ... For an admissions plan using race to
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be constitutional, the court majority said, it must be "truly
individualized" and operate " in a flexible , nonmechanical
way" (Denniston 2003).

By discussing both the limits and significance of the decision ,
these particular articles provide both a context and an assessment
of the implications of the decisions for their readers. However,
this type of analysis was missing from most of the articles examined in our research.

CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

Most newspapers reported on the Grutter and Gratz rulings,
addressed the legal queries in both cases, expressed support for
these split judgments , and considered the repercussions of the
rulings. On the basis of these findings, it might appear that the
press did a thorough and accurate job translating and disseminating to the public the content and consequences of the cases. But
this is not the whole story. Most interesting are the elements that
were not mentioned in the press ' interpretation of these casesthe concurring and dissenting opinions , and the political and legal context.
One of the fundamental findings of our study is that most of
the press did not contextualize the cases. For example, they did
not put into perspective the closeness of the votes-5 to 4 in Grutter and 6 to 3 in Gratz . These narrow votes would seem to reinforce the significance of possible retirements and replacements
on the Court. At the time of the rulings, the expected retirement
of O' Connor meant that a new Justice could portend changes in
affirmative action policy (Lithwack 2004, Taylor 2004), and the
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recent appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alita
underscore and magnify that possibility.
In addition, the majority of newspapers did not consider the
legal milieu in which the Court considered Grutter and Gratz.
Prior to the Supreme Court decisions, federal appellate courts
had offered conflicting opinions as to whether colleges and universities could use race as a factor in admissions. In fact , the
Fifth and Eleventh Courts of Appeal had ruled that colleges
could not consider race in selecting students , while the Sixth
Circuit had ruled otherwise. Frequently, when lower courts are
divided , the Supreme Court steps in to clarify the law, which is
precisely what the Supreme Court attempted to do in these two
judgments . However, by " splitting the baby," the Court was able
to provide each perspective precedental support in the decisions-race can be used in admissions decisions, but cannot be
used too extensively.
Yet another consideration is that most newspapers did not
place into context the telling fact that Gratz and Grutter did not
accidentally arrive at the Supreme Court 's door. As many political scientists have noted, there are a variety of societal and political factors that influence what cases the Supreme Court hears
and decides. As a political body , the Court is influenced by national debates , albeit in a fashion markedly different from the
other, electorally-accountable, branches.
The Supreme Court [does] not cut these issues from whole
cloth. Public debates over racially segregated schools, censorship, and government support of religion were all part of
the national discourse prior to the Court 's involvement. The
intensity of the debate waxed and waned with events, public
opinion, or media attention; and these dialogues continued
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after the Court began to express its views (Fleming, Bohte ,
and Wood 1997, 1225).

In the case of affirmative action, the Michigan lawsuits reflected a concerted effort by conservative interest groups to sway
the Court to invalidate affirmative action plans by bringing carefully framed litigation through the lower federal courts (Bean
2004). A superficial examination of amici briefs submitted by
supporters of the plaintiffs in both Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter
v. Bollinger expose the well-organized and well-funded interests
of conservative groups whose bottom line goal is to eliminate
policies that may burden white males in increasingly competitive
settings (Taylor 2004, Phillips 2004) .
Another point worth considering is the fact that most news
accounts neglected to describe the nexus between affirmative
action programs and past and present racial discrimination. The
history of affirmative action policy and its subsequent discourse,
conflicts, and decision-making creates a complex context that
must be recounted to fully understand the impact of these decisions. Gandy, et al. (1997, 160) explain that "depending on the
ways in which the problem of inequality is framed, then, press
coverage may lead citizens toward, or away from, support of
particular public policies." This finding also reinforces the argument of Slotnick and Segal (1998) regarding the media's influence over public opinion towards the Bakke case and affirmative
action in higher education.
When considering the historical context of these cases and affirmative action policy, it is worth recalling the words of DuBois
in 1903, when he said that the problem of the twentieth century
is that of the color line. One hundred years later, in Gratz, Justice Ginsburg documented ongoing racial bias in education, employment, and housing; she looked upon affirmative action as
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one remedy for differential treatment in policy areas. In her
words, "the stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society ... and the determination to hasten its removal
remains vital." Justice Ginsburg saw the connection between
America's racial history and affirmative action policy; most of
the press did not.
A final set of observations concerns the fact that, by failing to
include in their reports dissenting opinions in Grutter and Gratz,
the public was unable to develop a full or complete picture of the
arguments against the Court's decisions to uphold a law school
affirmative action plan and to strike down the undergraduate
program. Newspapers' failure to cover all opinions may, as we
have noted, be due to a variety of factors, including the press '
need to avoid the legal lexicon, limited time and space, and editors' determination that not all of the decisions were important
enough to warrant coverage. Ironically, by covering solely the
majority's determination, the press may enhance the judiciary 's
legitimacy by presenting Court decisions as uncontested internally. Because the media did not provide competing understanding of the rulings, either in editorials or in the Court's opinions
themselves , the public may be more willing to simply accept the
Court's decisions than to pursue additional means of avoiding
compliance.
While we have found that newspaper coverage of the Grutter
and Gratz cases were more accurate than the television coverage
Slotnick and Segal (1998) evaluated in Bakke, there were clear
limitations to the reporting. This is unfortunate. In a democracy,
the public is heavily reliant on the media to provide adequate and
clear coverage of the judiciary. But in the Michigan cases , where
the media accused the Court of "splitting the baby," newspapers
did the same in their coverage. By reporting on the content of
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the majority rulings but by failing to adequately discuss the
background and implications of the decisions , the public was
deprived of relevant information needed to assess the Court's
judgments and the contested issue of affirmative action.
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